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Recent Cases

Due to the length of time that
NYSLA's unconstitutional ban on
Bad Frog's labels had been in effect,
the court directed the district court
to enjoin NYSLA from rejecting the
company's label application.
However, the court denied Bad
Frog's claims for damages against
the three NYSLA commissioners
because it found that the
commissioners' decision to reject
Bad Frog's application was not
unreasonable in light of the district
court's findings. Therefore, the
NYSLA commissioners were
entitled to qualified immunity.
Bad Frog's State Law Claims
Bad Frog raised several state law
claims against the NYSLA
commissioners in their individual
capacities under the New York State
Constitution and the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Law. In denying

Bad Frog's request for a preliminary
injunction, the district court found
that the Eleventh Amendment
barred the claims. In its opinion
granting summary judgment in
favor of NYSLA and dismissing
Bad Frog's federal claims, the
district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). The appellate court,
disagreeing with the district court,
found that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar all of Bad
Frog's state law claims. However,
due to the numerous novel and
complex state law issues raised, the
court of appeals declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.

under the First Amendment. Under
the Central Hudson framework, the
State unconstitutionally banned the
brewery's labels. Although the
government's interests in insulating
children from vulgarity and
promoting tolerance were
substantial, the prohibition on Bad
Frog's labels did not materially
advance these interests.
Furthermore, the complete ban on
the labels was more extensive than
necessary to accomplish the state's
interests. Therefore, the Second
Circuit reversed the grant of
summary judgment in favor of
NYSLA, and directed the district
court to enjoin NYSLA from
prohibiting Bad Frog's labels.

Bad Frog Hits the Shelves
With Finger Held High
In sum, Bad Frog's beer labels
enjoy commercial speech protection

Court Established Accrual Rule for Keyboard Users
Afflicted with Repetitive Stress Injury
By Michael J. Calhoun
In Blanco v. American
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 689
N.E.2d 506 (N.Y. 1997), the Court
of Appeals of New York ruled on a
certified question that the cause of
action for computer keyboard users
who suffer from repetitive stress
injury ("RSI') accrues at the onset
of the user's symptoms or latest use
of the keyboard, whichever occurred
first.
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Common Issues Raised By
Various Repetitive Stress
Injury Cases
RSI is a latent injury affecting
musculo-skeletal tissue. Activities
that involve repeated movements
and exertions of musculo-skeletal
tissue, such as playing video games
or operating a jackhammer, cause

RSI. Recently, however, many
computer keyboard users have been
inflicted by this disorder. Carpel
tunnel syndrome, the predominant
type of RSI involves "compression
of the median nerve as it passes
through the wrist between the flexor
tendons and the transverse carpal
tunnel ligament." Recent
widespread use of computer
keyboards accounts for the
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significant increase in carpal tunnel
syndrome cases. For instance,
diagnoses of RSI increased by
approximately "1000% between
1982 and 1991" and "account for
61% of all workplace illnesses."
The issue of when a cause of
action "accrue[s] against a keyboard
manufacturer for [a] repetitive stress
injury suffered by a keyboard user"
was brought before the Court of
Appeals of New York as a certified
question. After observing a common
pattern among RSI cases, an
administrative judge assigned over
ninety RSI cases to the Supreme
Court of New York. The Supreme
Court of New York subsequently
consolidated the claims and allowed
for joint briefing of certain legal
issues since the cases presented
similar questions because each
plaintiff: (1) presented a history of
keyboard use; (2) asserted that RSI
was so "'insidious ...it is not
possible to identify ... the precise
date of the onset of symptoms;"' (3)
identified dates on which some
symptoms of RSI, such as numbness
and pain, were first recognized; (4)
submitted dates on which each were
diagnosed with RSI; and (5) alleged
that RSI has "'no precise moment of
injury', but rather a 'cumulative and
prolonged process by which [each]
plaintiff sustained injury [and]
aggravated [an] existing injury."'
Many of the keyboard users had
no noticeable symptoms of RSI until
a considerable time after their first
use of a keyboard. Thus, the court
had difficulty determining when a
cause of action for RSI accrued.
Plaintiffs presented two primary
arguments for providing a
distinctive accrual rule in RSI cases.
First, Plaintiffs argued that in RSI
cases the court should apply a New
York "discovery" rule, which is
applicable in toxic torts cases.
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Under this statute, "the three year
period within which an action to
recover damages for personal injury
must be commenced shall be
computed from the date of discovery
of the injury by the plaintiff or from
the date when through the exercise
of reasonable diligence such injury
should have been discovered by the
plaintiff, whichever is earlier." N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 214-c (McKinney 1997).
Second, Plaintiffs argued that the
statute of limitations should have
been extended since Defendants had
a "continuing duty to warn"
keyboard users of potential hazards
caused by defects in their products.
At trial, Defendants claimed that
the statute of limitations expired
and, therefore, Plaintiffs' recovery
was barred. However, Plaintiffs
successfully argued at trial that the
CPLR 214-c discovery rule should
be applied to RSI cases. The trial
court thus held that "accrual in RSI
cases is measured from the onset of
the plaintiff's symptoms without
requiring a diagnosis of their
cause.
The keyboard manufacturers
appealed the trial court's ruling. On
appeal, the Appellate Division
rejected the trial court's application
of the CPLR 214-c discovery rule to
RSI cases. Instead, it held that a
cause of action for RSI cases begins
with the first use of a computer
keyboard, not at the onset of
symptoms. The Appellate Division
held that the "first exposure" rule,
used in New York toxic torts cases
before the enactment of CPLR
214-c, controlled RSI cases. The
court found RSI cases
indistinguishable from cases in
which a plaintiff suffered from
repeated and prolonged exposure to
toxic substances, such as asbestos.

Rejection of Discovery Rule
Upheld
The Court of Appeals of New
York, upholding the Appellate
Division's rejection of the CPLR
214-c discovery rule, affirmed that a
keyboard is not a "substance" and
does not fall under CPLR 214-c.
However, the court found that CPLR
214, which provides that all causes
of action for personal injuries,
except those which fall under CPLR
214-c, must commence within three
years from the time the actual injury
occurred. Under CPLR 214, a cause
of action accrues as soon as all of
the facts supporting a prima facie
case occur.
The Court of Appeals of New
York also rejected Plaintiffs'
argument that the keyboard
manufacturers had a "continuing
duty to warn" keyboard users of
potential defects in their products.
The Court refuted the "continuing
duty to warn" argument, stating that
causes of action in negligence cases
accrue at the date of injury.

Court Examined Latent
Injury Cases in an Attempt to
Find Guidance
Although the Court of Appeals
rejected the trial court's application
of the CPLR 214-c discovery rule, it
also rejected the Appellate
Division's application of the "fast
exposure" rule. However, the court
recognized a similarity between
cases in which the "first exposure"
rule is applied and RSI cases.
Specifically, both deal with latent
injuries - injuries that have
indiscernible symptoms and that
develop slowly over time. The court
cited Martin v. EdwardLabs', 457
N.E.2d 1150 (N.Y. 1983), which
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provided the basic framework for
dealing with latent injury cases, and
the Court of Appeals of New York
identified three categories of latent
injuries cases: assimilation cases,
involuntary implantation cases, and
voluntary implantation cases. Each
type of case has its own
corresponding "accrual" rule for the
statute of limitations.
Assimilation cases involve
situations where the injuries result
from inhaling, ingesting, or
injecting a harmful substance that is
incorporated into the body. The
"first exposure" rule was applied to
such cases until the enactment of
CPLR 214-c. In Schmidt v.
Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co.,
200 N.E. 824 (N.Y. 1936), for
instance, the court applied the "first
exposure" rule when the Plaintiff
contracted a lung disease known as
pneumoconiosis, which resulted
from his exposure to toxic silicone
dust while working for the
Defendant. Schmidt applied the
"first exposure" rule because an
injury to the Plaintiff, not the
Defendant's negligence, caused the
plaintiff's lung disease. Although
the defendant's negligence directly
caused the injury, it was not a direct
cause of the lung disease.
Involuntary implantation cases
involve objects that are left in
someone's body after an operation.
A discovery rule applies in such
instances. In Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 248 N.E.2d 871
(N.Y 1969), the court applied a
discovery rule in a medical
malpractice suit where a physician
left a surgical clamp inside a patient
after an operation. The patient did
not suffer any noticeable injury until
eight years after the initial
operation. The court applied the
discovery rule because the clamp
was implanted in the patient's body
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without the patient's knowledge or
consent. Furthermore, Plaintiff
clearly had not brought a fraudulent
claim of injury "since the objects
retained their identity within the
body." Likewise, there was a clear
causal connection between the
alleged negligence and the injury.
Also, there was no significant issue
of diagnostic credibility.
Finally, voluntary implantation
cases arise when a device, such as a
pacemaker, malfunctions after
someone has the device implanted
into his or her body. These cases are
treated like product liability cases
since the injury does not arise until
the product malfunctions. In
Martin, the cause of action for the
recipient of a defective heart valve
accrued when "the defect actually
caused the injury," not when the
heart valve entered the recipient's
body. The court further
distinguished voluntary from
involuntary implantation cases,
noting that in voluntary cases, a
voluntary recipient knew that a
foreign object was inserted into his
body and consented to the
implantation. The court also
distinguished voluntary
implantation cases from
assimilation cases because
"implants are intended to perform a
continuing function."
"New Balance" of Policy
Considerations Required to
Determine RSI Accrual Rule
"A computer keyboard is not a
toxic substance which is ingested
into the body, nor is it an object
implanted, but not assimilated, into
the body." Although analogous to
other latent injury cases, RSI cases
are distinguishable because
keyboards remain outside of their

users' bodies and there is no way to
determine precisely when the injury
first occurred. Thus, the Court of
Appeals of New York stated, "[t]his
case requires us to strike a new
balance with respect to the
competing policy interests at stake
in order to correctly determine the
accrual question."
Although toxic torts cases and
RSI cases are significantly different,
the court noted that they share
several similarities. First, both
require "repeated, prolonged
exposure... before the damages
will develop and manifest
themselves." In other words, the
injury in both types of cases is not
evident until well after first
exposure to the product that is the
alleged cause of injury. This creates
"a gap between the manufacturer's
breach of duty and the resulting
ultimate injury to the plaintiff."
This gap makes it difficult to
accurately assess a given
defendant's liability. Further,
"significant problems of proof'
arise due to the time required for
latent injuries to manifest.
Taking into consideration the
similarities between toxic torts and
RSI cases, the court provided a
detailed analysis of the reasoning
employed in cases that apply the socalled "first exposure" rule. Schmidt
was the first New York case to apply
a "first exposure" rule. The court in
that case held that the cause of
action for an injury accrues as soon
as a "wrongful invasion of personal
or property rights" takes place.
Schmidt, 200 N.E. at 827. Then in
Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem.
Corp., 188 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1963),
the "first exposure" rule from
Schmidt was applied to a case where
the plaintiff was exposed to a
harmful substance used to make xrays. Although Schmidt and
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Schwartz are similar insofar as they
are both "based upon the
assumption that a toxic substance
acts immediately upon the body to
produce injury," RSI cases are
distinguishable in this respect. The
court in the present case held that
"the justifications that gave rise to
the exposure rule do not apply" in
RSI cases because a keyboard is not
"an inherently toxic or dangerous
substance." Someone who touches
or uses a keyboard is not doomed to
contract RSI; rather, RSI results
from "an accumulation of events."
The court weighed several other
policy considerations in reaching its
final ruling. The court noted a
balance between "a defendant's
interest in repose" and "the injured
person's interest in having a
reasonable opportunity to assert a
claim." In addressing these two
policy objectives, the court noted
that there was a possibility of false
claims in cases where "excessive

factual inquiries would be
necessary." The court also
mentioned the difficulty of tracing
the history of latent injuries. A
related policy the court considered
was that defendants have an extra
burden in RSI cases since the
history of a latent injury is difficult
to trace. The court further
recognized the possibility of a
"causal break" between a
defendant's alleged negligence and
a plaintiff's claimed injury.
Additional considerations included
the promotion of justice, stability to
human affairs, judicial economy,
self-reformation by defendants, and
possible unfairness to defendants
who might have to defend against
stale claims, and questions of
credibility and professional
diagnostic judgment.
In its final analysis, the court
concluded that the cause of action
for a keyboard user inflicted by RSI
accrues when the user first

experiences symptoms of RSI or
when he last used a keyboard,
whichever happened earlier. The
court noted that RSI cases pose
certain problems of proof. The court
explained, however, that it had tried
to find the "proper balance between
giving a plaintiff an opportunity to
commence an action after becoming
aware of a symptom of injury and
providing certainty and
predictability to manufacturers,
employers and other economic
actors in their risk assessment,
while also avoiding stale claims." In
sum, the Court of Appeals of New
York answered the certified
question in the negative, remitted
the case to the Supreme Court of
New York, and ordered the Supreme
Court to rule on RSI cases in
accordance with its the ruling.

Pharmacies Charge Prescription Drugs Manufacturers
and Wholesalers with Antitrust Violations Through
Price-Fixing Conspiracy
By KarinaZabicki

In In re Brand Name
Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litigation, 123 F.3d 599 (7th Cir.
1997), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed the decision of the
Northern District Court of Illinois,
holding: (1) indirect purchasers
may not bring suit against
manufacturers in federal court for
an overcharge that direct purchasers
130

°

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

allegedly passed on to the indirect
purchasers; (2) sufficient evidence
existed to create a jury issue of
whether the direct purchasers were
participants in a price-fixing
conspiracy; (3) a suit brought in an
Alabama state court claiming a
violation of state antitrust laws
defeated the application of the
"artful pleading" doctrine; and (4) a
newly-merged company which

abandoned its predecessor's
participation in the alleged
conspiracy did not clear it of
liability for its predecessor's
antitrust violations.
This litigation involved hundreds
of price-fixing cases brought under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1. Plaintiffs and
Defendants appealed four of these
rulings, which the Seventh Circuit
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